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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Forces singular to the Washington D.C. black community shaped the 
experience of the Washington chapter, and the Chapter’s best work for the poor of 
Washington was when the remaining Panther members agreed to work within the 
system and ignore the militant posture of the National Office of the Black Panther 
Party.  This thesis focuses on the unique problems and persecutions of the D.C. 
chapter, their contributions to the community from their programs, and their 
individual activism and exploits. 
Using primary sources and secondary accounts of the party, along with 
interviews of former members, the D.C. Panthers experience differed from other 
chapters around the nation.  The official Washington chapter was established 
three years after Oakland, Chicago, and New York; and the National Office of the 
Black Panther Party looked to set up an outpost of the Party in the belly of the 
beast, the capital of capitalism.  The pressures put on the chapter in the first six 
months forced a transformation.  The remaining members provided programs for 
the poor, and the less dedicated members soon lost interest or were incarcerated.  
The Washington chapter was in hostile territory, especially with the 
internationalist and integrationist platform of the Oakland headquarters.  The 
numbers dwindled, but the idealists continued to work for the community.  Today, 
many ex-members of the Washington chapter volunteer to help with the deprived 
of D.C.  The lessons learned during the four years (1970-1974) of the Washington 
chapter’s existence produced several community activists focused on an ignored 
and oppressed segment of society. 
 v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
Several people deserve credit for guiding me through this project to 
completion.  Dr. Glen Anthony Harris’ great knowledge of the topic gave 
direction and support, along with many hours discussing Washington D.C.’s 
particular situation, helped crystallize my arguments.  Dr. Kathleen Berkeley’s 
extensive editing and guidance provided much needed focus to the topic, and 
narrowed the subject to the experience of the Panthers in Washington D.C.  Dr. 
Michael Seidman’s expertise in the rise of the New Left and Maoist theory gave 
new understanding to the Panther’s platform and goals, as well as an international 
perspective of the leftist movements of the 1960s.  With the paucity of sources in 
the field besides newspaper accounts, I truly thank the individuals who shared 
their time with me in interviews relating to the Washington chapter.  Councilman 
and former Mayor Marion Barry enlightened me with his discussion of home rule, 
and the relationship between his organization, Pride, and the Panthers.  Thanks to 
Dr. Jean Linzau from the D.C. Board of Medicine and a director of Howard 
University Hospital who described the Panthers and their free clinic that he ran.  
Appreciation as well to Ron Clark of RAP of Washington D.C. and his 
description of the Panthers, as well as to Sherry Brown’s insight as the longest 
tenured Minister of Information of the Washington chapter.   
 My thanks also go to my family’s support and interest in my work, to my 
fellow graduate students who challenged me to excel in my scholarship, but most 
importantly to my wonderful wife Donielle, who supported my goal and provided 
stability and sanity while holding down four jobs herself. 
 vi
DEDICATION 
 
 
To Donielle, my muse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
MAPS AND IMAGES OF THE WASHINGTON PANTHER CHAPTER 
 
 
Map of the 
District of 
Columbia 
Map of D.C. 
Panthers 
Neighborhood 
 viii
 
Picture of Panther supporters on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial on 
June 19, 1970.  (Picture by Washington Post) 
 
 
 
 
 ix
 
Juan Schoop, one of the 16th month old twins taken to jail July 4th after 
police broke into the Black Panther Community Information Center, rested on a 
pamphlet table.  Looking is Panther Wayne Purcell.  (Photo by Geoffery Gilbert, 
Washington Post) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x
 
Two pictures of the Community Information Center during the build up to 
the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention November 27-29,1970.  On 
right, Elbert “Big Man” Howard, the editor of the Black Panther newspaper and 
the national Minister of Information gives a press conference Oct. 6,1971. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
 
Robert Rippy, founder of the first chapter of the Black Panthers in D.C. 
 
Marion Barry, Fall 1971, successfully running for D.C. school board. 
 
Sherry Brown, Minister of Information for Washington chapter, pictured 
in 2005. 
 
 
 xii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by the Washington Chapter, July 1970. 
 xiii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The backside art on the Open Letter to the People, July 1970. 
 xiv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bogus cartoons created by the FBI’s CONINTELPRO unit to sway public 
opinion against the Black Panthers. 
 
 
 
 
 xv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flyer published by the Washington Chapter, October 1970. 
 xvi
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Black Panther Party’s official Washington D.C. chapter formed July 19, 
1970, much later than the thirty-seven other chapters around the country, some of 
which had been in existence for four years by then.  This later formation was a result 
of many factors, most importantly the lack of a city government to run and organize 
black neighborhoods and the affluence of many D.C. blacks.1  The District of 
Columbia’s unique federal territory status outlawed structures of city government that 
were available to other Panther chapters.  The Black Panther’s militant communist 
platform was Marxist-Leninist and socialist, and as such threatened many blacks and 
whites in the District.2  The D.C. Panthers incurred extensive law enforcement 
surveillance and persecution from the FBI and the Metropolitan Police during the 
summer and fall of 1970, with over twenty-eight Panthers charged with crimes and 
arrested.  The well-publicized Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention 
created the Washington chapter’s existence, and responsibility to organize the 
Convention fell on the shoulders of the D.C. Panthers.  The massive failure of the 
convention drove many wavering Panther members away, and out of the ruins of the 
failure the remaining revolutionary activists refocused their efforts to first and 
foremost helping the D.C. poor. 
The first chapter describes the rise of Black Power in D.C. in the wake of the 
assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the riots that followed.  Robert Rippy, a 
                                                 
1 Washington D.C. black neighborhoods primarily started east of Rock Creek Park in the District, 
especially the Shaw-Cardozo area where the Panther headquarters were located.  United States Census, 
1970.  
2 Jessica Christina Harris,  “Revolutionary Black Nationalism: The Black Panther Party,” Journal of 
Negro History, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), 162-174. 
 2
cultural nationalist activist who became radicalized during his association with the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), founded the first group to 
organize and replicate the Black Panthers’ actions.  Rippy’s small group looked to 
join the Panthers but was rejected by the National Committee of the Black Panther 
Party at the Unity Against Fascism conference held in California in 1969 because of 
Rippy’s anti-white views.  The National Committee of the Black Panther Party would 
not grant a charter to Rippy and his “cultural nationalists” because they disapproved 
of the Panthers’ coalition politics with white radicals from the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS).  During the height of Black Panther exposure in the 
national media, from June 1969 to June 1970, the D.C. area was without a Black 
Panther presence, and because of the unique situation of wealth and government 
oppression, rival leaders of black nationalist groups believed a chapter would never 
be founded in the capital of the United States.  In January 1970 Washingtonian 
Reverend Douglas Moore, leader of the Black United Front, said that it would be 
suicide for the Black Panthers to establish a chapter in the nation’s capital, because of 
the intense persecution and outright slaughter of Black Panthers by law enforcement.3 
The nation’s capital was organized from the beginning as a special, stateless 
District of Columbia, almost fully dependant upon the U.S. Congress for everything 
from its annual budget to criminal ordinances.  The intent was to save Washington, 
D.C. from falling prey to any narrow sectional interest; the result was that a busy city 
of 827,000 inhabitants- over 70% African-American- found itself at the mercy of 
                                                 
3 Joseph D. Whitaker, “Black Panther Drive Falters in D.C.,” Washington Post, 1 February 1970, A1, 
A8. 
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legislators whose various interests (a segregationist constituency back home, for 
example) had little to do with the district’s pressing needs.4 
 The 1970 United States census described Washington as a city 71.1 percent 
black compared to 27.7 percent white.  Only 4,974 whites, or 4.2% of the white 
residential population, lived in poverty.  According to the census bureau, 81,678 
black residents, 17% of the black population, lived under the federally mandated 
poverty levels in D.C.5 These levels were much lower than other black urban areas of 
the United States, with the most extreme example being Detroit, which had over a 
third of black residents living under the poverty level.  Inner cities throughout the 
U.S. dealt with white flight to the suburbs, and in Washington D.C. the effect was 
lessened by the entrenched black middle class east of Rock Creek Park.  The King 
riots of 1968 spurred some in the black middle and upper class to migrate to Prince 
Georges County, but this black flight of the inner-city really took off with the 
introduction of crack and the violence associated with crack dealing in the mid 
1980’s.6   
Black unemployment at the time of the 1970 census was 43,848,or 12 percent 
of the black workforce of 360,048.  Young black males (16-29 years of age) had the 
highest unemployment rate of 16.4 percent.  White unemployment was much less for 
                                                 
4 U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics, 
District of Columbia, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 
5 U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population: Poverty Status in 1969 and Ratio of Family Income 
to Poverty Level for Persons in Families and Unrelated Individuals, by Family Relationship, Age and 
Race, District of Columbia, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 
6 Howard Gillette, Jr, Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in 
Washington, D.C., (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 195-8. 
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city residents, with only 7.3% of white workers unemployed and the greatest majority 
of those whites who were unemployed were in the 16-29 year old age bracket.7 
Opportunities for blacks employed in professional administration or white-
collar jobs were greater in Washington D.C. because of the federal government’s 
drive to increase diversity in the bureaucracy that started with the Johnson 
administration.  The 1970 census identified 151,486 black residents employed in 
white-collar positions in the District, positions that made three times the mandated 
poverty level.  Positions in the federal or district government, academia, or private 
industry created much greater opportunities not available to blacks in other areas of 
the country.8 
The bourgeois reputation of Washington D.C.’s black community made it 
difficult to organize and recruit, and the official chapter’s roots were in the Baltimore 
chapter of the Black Panther Party.  Members of the Panthers began selling the 
Panther newspapers in D.C. and acquired a D.C. coordinator by the name of Jim 
Williams, sent from Oakland in January of 1970.  This “branch” office of the 
Panthers became a National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) office in D.C., in 
the activist neighborhood of Shaw, close to the headquarters of Marion Barry’s 
organization Pride, Inc and other activist groups.  By Spring 1970 the stage was set, 
and the second chapter traces the movement from the foundation of the party to the 
spectacular failure of the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention. 
                                                 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population: Labor Force Status and Year last Worked of 
Persons Not in the Labor Force by Age, Race, and Sex: 1970, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972). 
8 U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population: Labor Force Status and Year last Worked of 
Persons Not in the Labor Force by Age, Race, and Sex: 1970, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972). 
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The founding of the D.C. chapter, which began officially a month after the 
tragedy at Kent State, became a manifestation for radicals of the growing animosity 
towards the Nixon administration and the “system.”  With the reputation of the 
Panthers preceding them, the multiple raids and arrests attested to the militant 
confrontational stance adopted by the D.C. Panther chapter during its first six months 
of existence, and was similar to the experiences of the larger chapters of New York, 
Los Angeles, and Oakland.  Unique conditions and experiences molded the D.C. 
Panthers into a different type of chapter, one that quickly turned fiery, violent 
militants into peaceable community activists.  The fewer remaining Panther members 
could assist their Washington neighborhoods more effectively working within the 
system and influencing the new city government.  
The turning point for the D.C. party was Thanksgiving Weekend, 1970.         
The Washington chapter failed its main reason for existence, securing a convention 
hall for the highly publicized Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention.  The 
violent leftist revolutionary militant organization depicted in the press and by its own 
earlier open letters and press releases departed from its bravado.  Washington 
Defense Captain Jim Williams and the remaining members of the D.C. Panthers 
transformed the chapter into a dedicated, effective, and peaceful community support 
entity that embraced new opportunities provided by the creation of self-rule.9  This 
change to activism and community support is highlighted in chapter three, and a 
changed party emerged to uplift the poor in D.C.’s blighted neighborhoods. 
                                                 
9 Sherry Brown (Minister of Information for the D.C. and Baltimore Chapters of the Black Panther 
Party), interview by author, 20 February 2006. 
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The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, founded in 1966 by Huey Newton 
and Bobby Seale, represented black militant radicalism and a profound departure 
from the goals of integration championed by Martin Luther King Jr. and other 
traditional Civil Rights leaders.  Scholarship about the Black Panthers in the context 
of the larger Civil Rights Movement, particularly the transformation and radical 
history of the Panthers, often depicts the party as a radical sect bent upon the 
destruction of the white capitalist state.10  Scholarly interpretation focusing on the 
Black Panthers ranges from crazed hooligans, to a necessary evil, to avenging angels; 
during the Vietnam War the New Left movement of the 1960s depicted the Panthers 
as the vanguard of communist revolution.11 
The methodology used in this project is different from previous scholarship 
because of the dearth of published sources.  Little work has been published about the 
Washington, D.C. Panthers, and perhaps because this small organization left few 
written documents.  Many other existing primary sources like police and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation files are confidential, and the request period for classified 
documents exceeds the time constraints of this project.  The use of interviews of those 
close to or inside the chapter has covered many subjects relating to the existence and 
transformation of the party in D.C., and has painted a canvas of transformation. 
The Panthers established "survival programs" (free breakfast programs, sickle 
cell anemia testing) as a way of gaining legitimacy in the face of government 
persecution and attacks.  The government and the establishment perceived these 
programs as a greater threat than the violence associated with the Panthers in its 
                                                 
10 Massimo Teodori, The New Left: A Documentary History, (New York Bobs-Merrill, 1969), p.276-9. 
11 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960’s, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press), 1981. 
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earlier years.  The role of the Panthers in feeding and clothing their communities 
supplanted the government’s lackluster programs in poor black communities 
nationwide, and the Panthers became subject to increased repression.12  The evolution 
from black nationalist militancy to community activism is a familiar theme among 
most chapters, but the Washington chapter’s members started late and ended early 
because of the District’s overarching hostility to militant groups. 
The histories of individual chapters have been ignored in deference to the 
drama that unfolded in Oakland, and to a lesser extent the killing of Fred Hampton 
and Mark Clark in Chicago, Alex Rackley’s murder in New Haven, and the Panther 
21 trial in New York which have been reported about and written about extensively.  
Scholars have mostly ignored the histories of chapters for the easier route of 
reinterpreting the relationship between the leadership of the Black Panthers. 
The proclamations and writing of the Black Panther’s leadership often glorify 
the movement.  Huey Newton’s The Huey P. Newton Reader, describes the many 
transformations of Newton's and the party's political ideologies and motivations.  
Newton also included articles supporting the feminist and gay rights movements and 
coalitions with white radicals.  As a collection of writings of the Panthers’ most 
charismatic leader, this text is great primary-source material for understanding the 
goals of the National Organization of the Black Panther Party.  Newton describes the 
Panthers’ grass roots organizing and goals of the black power movement.13  The 
                                                 
12 Jama Lazerow Yohuru R. Williams. “Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power, and 
Black Panthers ,” Book Review 2001 Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, 
Inc. 
13 Huey Newton, Huey Newton’s Reader, David Hilliard ed., (New York: Random House, 1984). 
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ideals of the Panthers are laid out simply, and the ideas of the Panthers seem quite 
drastic. 
Similarly, Black Panthers Speak, edited by Phillip S. Foner with a foreword 
by Clayborne Carson, is a collection of primary documents.  Possibly the most 
important source of original material of the Party, it includes cartoons, flyers, and 
articles by Bobby Seale, Eldridge Cleaver, and Newton.14  Perhaps the most 
important primary source on Black Power is Kwame Ture (aka Stokely Carmichael) 
and his mantra Black Power: The Politics of Liberation.  First written in 1967 with 
Charles Hamilton, this revolutionary work supposedly exposed the depths of racism 
in the United States.  The system was envisioned as racist and entrenched, and Ture’s 
work became the political framework of cultural nationalist groups and the Maoist 
Black Panthers.  It was a plan to find independence from oppressive white America.15 
Scholars have advanced a number of conflicting views of the Panthers and 
their contribution to history.  Scholars in this polarized field viewed the Panthers as 
either thugs or visionary radicals (or both).  Elaine Brown's A Taste of Power and 
David Hilliard's This Side of Glory romanticized and glorified the party, ignoring the 
dark side of the Panthers.16  Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin’s America Divided: 
The Civil War of the 1960s argued a cultural civil war waged during the1960s, pitting 
the left-liberals on one side and conservatives on the other.  Isserman and Kazin 
                                                 
14 The Black Panthers Speak, Phillip Foner, ed., (New York: DeCapo Press, 1995). 
15 Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1992). 
16 Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992); David Hilliard, This Side of 
Glory, (Boston: Little Brown Press, 1993). 
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glorified the sacrifices of the Black Panthers as leaders of the New Left and depicted 
the Panthers as noble examples of romantic Third Worldists.17 
Hugh Pearson’s gritty view of the national party in The Shadow of the 
Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America posited an opposing 
view.  He concentrated on many of the negatives within the party, particularly drugs 
and criminality.  Many scholars thought the Black Panthers were destroyed by FBI 
counterintelligence.  Pearson's book, which provided a more accurate view of Panther 
history, suggests that the party fell apart over the party's criminal activities of some of 
its members.  Pearson argued the Panthers created a negative impact on the 
community and its members' lives which resulted in the Panther experiment.  He 
argued that the Party began as a criminal enterprise with revolutionary trappings and 
was eventually consumed by its own criminality.  Pearson contradicts the prevailing 
view that the Panthers began as a worthy endeavor but was tragically destroyed by 
mismanagement and illegal government efforts of CONITELPRO.  Pearson does not 
paint a completely bleak picture and notes the accomplishments of the Panthers, such 
as how the party brought serious attention to issues such as police brutality, and 
inspired urban youth all over the world.18   
The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered], edited by Charles E. Jones, 
depicts a Black Panther Party that fell apart because of the consequences of the 
unstable membership mix of political activists and quasi-criminal types.  Jones 
blasted the group's romantic notions of social revolution but also argued that the 
                                                 
17Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, (New York: 
Oxford University Press USA), 2003. 
18 Hugh Pearson.  Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America, 
(New York: Addison-Wesley, 1994). 
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Panthers became a base of Black Nationalism and a bridge to the white New Left.19  
Jennifer Smith published An International History of the Black Panther Party, a 
dissertation that focused on the international reach of the Panthers, with allied 
movements in Africa, Asia, South America, and the Caribbean.  The Panthers’ 
international reach influenced many activists around the world.  Smith highlights the 
global phenomenon of the Black Panther Party and showed how an international 
approach broadens and changes understanding of Black Panther history.20 
Dr. Yohuru Williams examined the inner workings of the New Haven Black 
Panther chapter torn apart by the Alex Rackley murder investigation, in which Bobby 
Seale was indicted.  Williams’ book is about much more than the Black Panther 
Party.  The city of New Haven, an interesting phenomenon, is described as the rise 
and demise of a "Model City," with Williams tracing the impact of the Panthers on 
big city Democratic mayors and the fate of postwar liberalism.  Williams uses 
newspapers, government documents, personal papers, and oral histories to construct 
his picture of a local Panther chapter.21 
In the most balanced book, Black Power: Radical Politics and African 
American Identity, Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar takes a new look at the Panthers and the 
Nation of Islam.  Dr. Ogbar argues many African Americans embraced the seemingly 
contradictory political agenda of desegregation and nationalism and he is critical of 
older understandings of the Panthers.  Ogbar suggests looking at the chapters on a 
                                                 
19 Charles Jones, The Black Panther Party Reconsidered, ed. by Charles E. Jones, (Baltimore, MD: 
Classic Black Press, 1998). 
20 Jennifer Smith, An International History of the Black Panther Party, Ph.D. dissertation, State 
University of New York at Buffalo, 1997. 
21 Yohuru Williams, Black Politics/White Power: Civil rights, Black power, and the Black Panthers in 
New Haven, (New York: Brandywine Press) 2000. 
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local, individual level instead of focusing on the overall national experience of the 
Panthers.22   
 The different scholarship paints a picture of defiance and glory, of criminality 
and thuggish behavior, and devotion to a downtrodden community with a 
undercurrent of rage.  By brandishing arms against police and embracing and 
distilling the Black Power message of self-determination, the Panthers frightened a 
white America recently forced to dismantle segregation and many whites struggled 
with the concept of equality with blacks.  Because of extensive media coverage, 
Panther chapters spread to many urban black ghettos, and the Maoist belief that 
power flowed through the barrel of a gun put the Black Panthers on a collision course 
with local law enforcement agencies. 
The ideal of Black Power, armed for revolution, formed in D.C. during 
December 1967, when Robert Rippy founded his psuedo-Panther group “The Black 
Defenders.”  The Black Panther Central Committee denied affiliation to this small 
group of “cultural” nationalists who were to champion Pan-Africanism in 1969, thus 
the real D.C. Panther party failed to form until May 1970.  Cultural nationalist groups 
believed in total segregation between blacks and whites, and followed leaders such as 
Stokely Carmichael, and the Black Muslims.  The Black Panthers’ decision in late 
1968 to ally with white radicals was considered counter-revolutionary to black racial 
nationalist groups (cultural nationalists).  Rippy’s group then joined the cultural 
nationalist Black United Front.  Black cultural nationalists created several groups in 
Washington, D.C, including the Black United Front, the Blackman’s Volunteer Army 
                                                 
22 Jeffery O.G. Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity, (New York: New 
York University Press, 2001.) 
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of Liberation, and Stokely Carmichael’s All African Peoples Revolutionary Party.  
These rival groups also contributed to the tardy formation of the official D.C. Black 
Panther chapter. 
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RISE OF BLACK POWER IN WASHINGTON D.C AND THE CULTURAL 
NATIONALIST PANTHERS 
 
 
Washington D.C.’s territory status meant that the city was administered by an 
appointed council and mayor handpicked by the federal government.  The District of 
Columbia appointments were delegated to the powerful District committee, presided 
over by influential conservative southerners in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
Residents of the federal District of Columbia were not allowed any participation in 
government, and only by the 1961 passage of the twenty-third amendment were D.C. 
residents allowed to vote for President.  The all-powerful District committee 
governed the majority black city of Washington, and District representatives were 
proponents and supporters of segregation.  The majority of the District committee 
allied itself with supporters of a segregated South, such as Alabama’s Governor 
George Wallace.  Governor Wallace symbolized the increased intensity of violence 
against the Civil Rights Movement by physically blockading black students from 
university classes.  The bombing of a black Birmingham church killed four young 
girls, and countless other racist acts were committed daily throughout the United 
States by the late 1960s.23  Nonviolent resistance changed to direct action for many 
younger civil rights demonstrators. 
In the 1950s, D.C. had become the first large city with a black majority, and 
those in Washington’s powerful black middle class enjoyed job security from the 
federal government.24  The black community in Washington, D.C. lost many wealthy 
                                                 
23 Alexander Bloom and Wini Breines, eds, “Takin’ it to the Streets”: A Sixties Reader, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 7-17.  
24 U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics, 
District of Columbia, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). 
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and powerful members after 1948 when the Supreme Court declared restrictive 
housing covenants illegal and the decision facilitated the flight of black elite to more 
affluent, predominantly white neighborhoods.  Continued destabilization of D.C.’s 
black community and ghettoization of neighborhoods followed the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and the 1968 Fair Housing Act, both of which hastened the flight of the black 
middle class to neighborhoods in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs.25  Areas east 
and north of the nation’s Captiol became poorer and less stable, rife with crime and 
vice, the same type of conditions the Black Panthers condemned nationwide. 
The violence of the white segregationists supported the belief of an eye for an 
eye and a tooth for a tooth for many of the young activists, especially those followers 
of the Nation of Islam and Malcolm X.  Early in 1966 when the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) elected Stokely Carmichael (later named Kwame 
Ture) and H. Rap Brown as leaders of a newly radicalized movement which purged 
white members from its ranks, the official reason was to send them to university 
campuses and white neighborhoods.  SNCC’s new leadership focused more on 
militant black activism and black power.26   
SNCC attracted younger and more direct action orientated recruits, including 
many liberal and Marxist-minded white youth.  Students for Democratic Society 
(SDS) leaders such as Tom Hayden and Mark Rudd volunteered to register black 
voters, and their exploits transmitted back to northern campuses inspired new 
                                                 
25 Fred Harris, Locked in the Poorhouse: Cities Race, and Poverty in the United States, (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 35-39. 
26 Hugh Pearson.  The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America, 
New York: Addison-Wesley, 1994, 48 and Brown, H. “Rap”, Die Nigger Die!, (New York: Dial 
Press), 1969.  
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activists.27  The 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer established the precedent for 
white and black leftists working together; the Panthers returned to coalition politics in 
late 1968 to the dismay of many black nationalists, especially the Black Nationalist 
group hoping to join the Panthers from Washington, D.C. 
In Washington D.C., a segregated town until the 1950’s, racial barriers were 
not as clear as the rigid segregation of the South, still racism and bias permeated the 
mentality of judges, police officers, real estate agents, and small businessmen, and the 
white power structure was viewed as engaged in a conspiracy to keep blacks 
oppressed.28  SNCC’s leader Stokely Carmichael dismissed the Civil Rights 
movement stating, “Integration is irrelevant.  Political and economic power is what 
black people have to have.”29  Washington’s black militants described the “white 
world” as a giant conspiracy and a “fascist” state arising.30 
The focus shifted from a caste societal problem (in the south) to a class 
problem (in the urban industrial cities of the north), and the enemies were no longer 
klansmen or southern sheriffs, but institutional racism.  Hostility shifted to the 
economic and political elites who perpetuated racism.  The new ideology of Black 
Power approved meeting violence with violence and arming for self-defense.31  
Northern cities dealt with riots, open housing marches, and school bussing during the 
late 1960’s with these confrontations seemingly intensifying each summer.  
Polarization and fragmentation of increasing militant Civil Rights groups such as the 
                                                 
27 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam 
1963-1975, (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 30-1. 
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Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and SNCC soon rejected the original goal of 
the Civil Rights Movement –integration- and national leadership of black militants 
began shifting to the Black Panther Party.32 
In Washington D.C., a new set of barriers unique to the Black Panthers 
prevented the formation of an official chapter for four and a half years.  The territorial 
status of the District encouraged Washingtonians to ignore local politics.  The lack of 
political organization led to political apathy particularly in D.C.’s black community. 
Without the sympathetic black city politicians that the Black Panthers had around 
country, and the rosters and rolls of those politicians, the Panthers found Washington 
an extremely difficult place to organize.  Combined with hostile competing Black 
Nationalist groups, the middle-class status of many Washington blacks contributed to 
this delay.33 
President Johnson’s administration changed the way the District would be 
administered.  Understanding and placating D.C. activists who demanded local 
government and representation, Johnson responded by using his powers to do away 
with the three-commissioner system, replacing it with a council and an appointed 
mayor, the black career bureaucrat Walter E. Washington.  During this same period, 
the city gained an elected school board. For the first time in a hundred years, local 
residents could vote in a city that now was more than 70% black by 1970.34  Among 
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the leaders elected was a school board member named Marion Barry, an advocate of 
black power.35 
The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) under the 
leadership of Stokely Carmichael began preaching armed resistance to racist police 
and a racist society.  This stance gained resonance with the assassinations of Malcolm 
X, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy.  The outbreaks of violence in urban 
areas continued to grow in intensity and the message that black communities were 
colonies under domination from the nation’s capital and the white police represented 
an “occupation army.”36  The racial tensions increased with the escalation of the 
Vietnam War, especially because the disproportion of draftees were poor blacks.  
Frustration with the stalled Civil Rights movement provided momentum to the new 
Black Power groups. 
Tumultuous times began in D.C. with riots in the wake of Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s assassination.  The rise of black power, increasing peace demonstrations, and the 
aggressive policing of the Nixon administration made D.C. a focal point for 
demonstrations.  A small group of District activists turned their attention to political 
apathy that had been ingrained for generations because of the District Committee; 
slowly many black D.C. residents began to support self-determination and backed the 
D.C. statehood movement.  The home rule movement reached a zenith in the fall of 
1970, cresting at the height of membership of the Washington Chapter, and many 
Panthers were active in the statehood cause.  The statehood goal and the idea of black 
government combined into one cause.  The city's more conservative blacks wanted 
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national representation of the District and agreed on home rule desired by 
progressives and black power advocates.37 
Black Power groups in D.C. included the unofficial Panthers, formed by 
Robert Rippy with four fully trained members in December 1967.  They met with a 
representative from the established New York Panther chapter and were told they had 
to meet Panther standards of membership and indoctrination before using the name.  
Rippy promptly named the group the Black Defenders.38   
In 1968 Rippy was a community organizer and supervisor for the United 
Planning Organization.  Rippy moved to the District from Salisbury, N.C., in 1950, 
and served in both the Marines and the Navy, then later in the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  His group was aimed at youths from age 14 and 
up, and Rippy wanted to train the recruits to deal with all types of crime occurring in 
the black community, especially crime by outsiders and police.  Applicants for his 
group had to own a gun as part of training, and the use of guns for self-defense was 
central to Rippy’s vision.39  This group modeled itself after the Panthers and again 
went out to secure a charter at the United Front Against Fascism conference in 1969.  
At the conference Huey Newton read a quote by Chairman Mao Tse Tung of the 
Chinese Communist Party.  “‘We are advocates of the abolition of war.  We do not 
want war, but war can only be abolished through war. In order to get rid of the gun it 
is necessary to pick up the gun.’ POWER TO THE PEOPLE!”40  After the speech 
Newton and the rest of the National Committee met with Rippy and his group, and 
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denied them a charter because Rippy abominated coalitions that included white 
radicals.41  
Later in 1969, Rippy opened a wig store in the 3100 block of Georgia Avenue 
NW, where he held meetings of the United Black Brotherhood.  The United Black 
Brotherhood were cultural nationalists who stated “you couldn’t look to your 
oppressor for salvation" and detested the alliance the Panthers made with white 
radical groups like the White Panthers and the Patriots.42  Howard students would 
come, and Rippy would teach out of The Autobiography of Malcolm X.  Rippy 
continued to be an advocate of black power but differed in ideology with the National 
Office of the Panthers.  Rippy’s United Black Brotherhood became rivals with the 
official Panthers when they formed in 1970, and both competed for new recruits.43 
Another advocate of black power in Washington was the future four-term 
Mayor, Marion Barry.  Barry was operations director of his self-help organization 
Pride, Inc. in July 1969, and he asked blacks not to take part in a national day of 
celebration to honor the Apollo 11 moon landing.  Barry stated “Why should blacks 
rejoice when two white Americans land on the moon when white America’s money 
and technology have not even reached the inner city?”44  In May 1970 Barry called on 
city residents to shoot any policeman entering their homes unannounced under the 
controversial “no knock” provision of a new crime bill.  This bill allowed police to 
burst into suspected criminals’ houses unannounced.45  He also labeled the 
Metropolitan Police an “alien army of occupation” and preached against the white 
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dominance of businesses in the inner-city after the 1968 riots.  “White (business) 
people should be allowed to come back only if the majority of the ownership is in the 
hands of blacks.”46 
Barry enjoyed a close relationship with the Washington Chapter of the Black 
Panthers.  Many Panther members were also members of Barry’s organization Pride.  
The Office of Economic Opportunity financed Barry’s self-help organization Pride in 
the aftermath of the Martin Luther King riots, as a “public rights organization.”47  
Formed in 1968, Youth Pride, soon shortened to Pride, Inc, set up headquarters at 16th 
and Florida Avenue in the Shaw neighborhood of D.C.  Located across from 
Meridian Hill (unofficially named Malcolm X) Park, the Shaw and Adams Morgan 
neighborhoods were home to many young black activists and Howard University 
students.48  Pride’s headquarters was a few houses down from the future Panther 
community center on 1732 17th street and two blocks from the future Panther chapter 
headquarters on 18th street.  When asked about the closeness of these organizations, 
Barry noted that many Panthers were also part of Pride.49 
The black power turn that SNCC took with the election of Stokely Carmichael 
as leader of SNCC made Barry separate himself from the newly radical SNCC so that 
he could apply for federal monies to establish poverty programs under Johnson’s 
Great Society initiatives.  He still supported the organization’s views of self-
determination and community control of police.50  Barry moved to the District in 
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1965, and has lived in the Capitol since that time.  He worked with and was close to 
Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Fred Hampton, Kathleen and Eldridge Cleaver, 
as well as other leaders of Black Power organizations and the Black Panther Party.51  
Barry’s drug problems and felony record notwithstanding, he made a profound 
influence on the Washington poor during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Many poor 
blacks credit him with finding their first job in the District, and Barry parleyed his 
organization Pride, Inc. into a grassroots political machine that helped him get elected 
to the first school board in 1971. 
The cultural nationalist group rejected by the National Committee in the 
summer of 1969 left Washington D.C. without Black Panther Party representation for 
close to a year.  In December of 1969 the well-publicized murder of Chicago leader 
Fred Hampton by the FBI added new sympathy to the Panther cause in Washington, 
D.C. and inspired a rally that drew attention from the National Committee of the 
Black Panther Party.  That December, a group named the Coalition Against Racism 
and Fascism (CARF) formed to serve as an umbrella for the area’s diversified black 
and anti-war organizations.  CARF sponsored a rally at the All Souls Unitarian 
Church on 16th and Harvard Streets NW on December 21, 1969 to protest the “murder 
of Black Panther members.”52  This rally’s main point was to support the cause and 
plight of the Black Panthers, even though no chapter existed in the District.  This rally 
did lead to the founding of the National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) in the 
spring of 1970, an organization created to raise funds and spur sympathy throughout 
Washington D.C. for the Black Panthers.  The Panther national headquarters in 
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Oakland sent Jim Williams to be the NCCF’s coordinator in Washington.  Williams 
stated some progress has been made in late 1969 and early 1970, but he was very 
disappointed in what he called the “bourgeois attitude” of Washington blacks.53 
Williams described the problem as “the government has been able to control 
the black people in this city through jobs and poverty programs, and has virtually 
silenced so-called community leaders by putting money into their pockets.”54  
Programs like Pride and similar anti-poverty work made D.C. more difficult to 
organize a revolutionary party.  Black Nationalist groups had already entrenched 
themselves into Washington’s black communities, especially those around Howard 
University.  The Black United Front was formed after the assassination of Malcolm X 
and included many radical splinter groups after SNCC disbanded.  They believed in 
revolution, as long as it took place within the context of a capitalistic system.  The 
Black United Front disavowed the methods expressed by the Maoist influenced 
Panthers and the felt private enterprise was central in securing equality with whites.  
Led by the Reverend Douglas Moore, the Black United Front adamantly denied 
working with white groups.  Moore stated “the policy not to participate in coalition 
with white groups is because we believe you cannot look to your oppressor for 
salvation.”55 
Another radical militant black group with a presence in Washington was the 
Blackman’s Volunteer Army of Liberation, led by Colonel Hassan Juru-Ahmed Bey.  
Bey’s group was a splinter group off the Black Muslim movement, and the Black 
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Muslims had a strong presence in the District as well as at Lorton reformatory, D.C.’s 
jail twenty miles south in the Virginia countryside.  The Panthers had entrenched 
militant groups to contend with, and Robert Rippy, by 1970 a member of the Black 
United Front, stated he didn’t “believe that the police and the FBI would allow a 
Black Panther Party to exist here in the form which they exist in other cities.”56  In 
addition to the predominately white Metropolitan Police, the capital was headquarters 
of the FBI, the Secret Service, the ATF, and other federal law enforcement agencies 
tasked with destroying the Black Panther Party.  Combined with no city government 
structure and entrenched black nationalist groups, the District was a very hostile 
environment for the Panthers to found a chapter. 
Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia set off massive campus unrest which resulted 
in the deaths of students at predominantly white Kent State and historically black 
Jackson State.  This galvanized the radical left, who felt the invasion was an 
expansion of the Vietnam War. With the SDS splintering at its convention in 1969, 
the Black Panther Party was the only national major New Left organization that 
continued to grow from 1968 to 1970.  The Panthers had become the vanguard of the 
radical militant revolutionaries, like the Weathermen and the American Indian 
Movement.  Its growth from a chapter in Oakland in 1966 to over 37 chapters 
nationwide by January 1970 made the Panthers targets of the CONINTEL program of 
the FBI, under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover who declared the Panthers the 
“number one domestic threat.”  In January of 1970 the party was under intense attack 
from the state, and police killed more than twenty-five Panthers by this time, 
according to Panther attorneys.  Seale was jailed while awaiting trial for murder, 
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Newton was imprisoned for attempted murder, and Eldridge Cleaver was in exile.57  
The only national leader of the Panthers not dead, imprisoned, or in exile was David 
Hilliard, who was jailed briefly in April following a speech in which he threatened 
the life of President Nixon.58 
David Hilliard and the national leadership of the Black Panthers felt it was the 
proper time to announce a new chapter formed in the nation’s capital, whose sole 
purpose was to provide loyal Panthers to organize the Revolutionary Peoples 
Constitutional Convention in the fall of 1970.  A rally was scheduled on the steps of 
the Lincoln Memorial for June 19th, 1970. 
 The District’s National Committee to Combat Fascism’s office became quite 
busy with inquires about the Panthers, and took direction from the close by and 
established Baltimore chapter.  Sherry Brown, the Minister of Information for the 
Baltimore chapter, described activists of the District’s NCCF excited because Hillard 
was coming in June, and a rumor was circulating that the NCCF was to be declared a 
full Panther chapter.59  
Four years after Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panthers 
for Self Defense, the rapidly expanding Black Panthers attempted to penetrate the 
capital of capitalism, the heart of the monster, the District itself.  Hilliard, Sherry 
Brown, and Jim Williams, the leader of the Washington D.C. NCCF, agreed that a 
Panther outpost should be official.60 
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DC PANTHERS FIGHT THE SYSTEM: CONFRONTANTION AND 
CONVENTION 
 
 
In May 1970, over 100 people were killed or wounded by the police and 
National Guard.  Besides the four murdered and ten wounded at Kent State white 
students on May 4 and the two black students murdered and twelve wounded at 
Jackson State on May 14th; six more blacks were murdered and twenty were wounded 
in race riots Augusta, Georgia; eleven students were bayoneted at the University of 
New Mexico; twenty people suffered shotgun wounds at Ohio State; and twelve 
students were wounded by birdshot in Buffalo.61  All these events were unified by the 
protest of the Cambodian invasion by the Nixon Administration. 
A top-secret special report written by the FBI for President Nixon described 
the Black Panther Party as “the most active and dangerous black extremist group in 
the United States.”  It continued describing the appeal of the Panthers:“ a recent poll 
indicates that approximately 25 percent of black population has a great respect or the 
BPP, including 43 percent of blacks under 21 yeas of age.”62  Regarded as an enemy 
of the government, the BPP came under intense legal scrutiny nationwide. 
This month of violence contributed to the formation of the Panther chapter in 
DC.  The power and influence of the Party had reached its zenith because it was the 
last remaining original organization of the coalition called the New Left, and leftist 
radicals worldwide looked to the Panthers to spark a revolution.  David Hilliard 
scheduled a speech in Washington, DC on June 19th to announce a call for a new 
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constitution and needed loyal Panthers to organize and prepare for the Revolutionary 
Convention.63 
David Hilliard was in Washington to help deliver the Message to America 
statement at the one hundredth seventh anniversary of the Emancipation 
Proclamation, which was held on the grounds of the Lincoln Memorial.  On July 19, 
1970, in front of over a thousand in attendance, David Hilliard declared that the 
District’s National Committee to Combat Fascism graduated to a Black Panther 
chapter, with the full backing of the National Committee.  He stated that the group 
had grown enough to be a full chapter.  His speech, on the same spot in front of the 
Lincoln Memorial where Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered his “I have a Dream” 
speech in August of 1963, railed against the Nixon administration, white colonization 
of black neighborhoods, and competing militant black power organizations like the 
Black Liberation Army.64  Hilliard, the Chief of Staff of the Black Panthers, gave 
Panther sympathizers full Panther membership with the agreement that the D.C. 
Panthers would be responsible for organizing and hosting this major convention.65  
Many speakers warned President Nixon that this new document, offering a true 
guarantee of freedom and justice to all Americans, was the only alternative to 
revolution in the country. 
The penultimate reason the chapter was formed was to secure a convention 
site for the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention in November 1970, an 
event that promised to be a significant gathering of New Left organizations.  The 
pressures placed on the chapter’s all-important goal turned many D.C. Panthers 
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against the guidance and authority of the National Office in Oakland, California when 
the convention’s lack of a hall became an embarrassment to the Panthers, an 
embarrassment whose blame focused on the D.C. chapter. 
The D.C. Panthers new headquarters were located near Howard University.  
The headquarters of the National Coalition to Combat Fascism (NCCF), based in a 
town house in the Adams Morgan/Shaw area, became the thirty-eighth chapter of the 
Black Panthers.  The Peoples Revolutionary Constitutional Convention was the 
reason the NCCF became the first official chapter of the Panthers in D.C. and its 
location was close to other radical groups.66  The Black Panthers promoted the Ten 
Point Plan, which demanded economic development, full employment, community 
services, and an end to police brutality.  This platform included coalitions with other 
radicals, regardless of skin color, sex or sexual orientation.  The predominantly black 
neighborhood around the new chapter headquarters contained many black power 
groups like the Blackman’s Volunteer Army and the Blackman’s Liberation Army, 
the Black United Front, and Marion Barry’s Pride.67  In the center of this 
neighborhood was the three block long Meridian Hill Park.  In 1969 Meridian Hill 
Park was lobbied by Black Nationalists to be renamed Malcolm X Park.  A bill was 
introduced to rename the site Malcolm X Park, although the bill failed, many referred 
to it as Malcolm X Park, and the area around Malcolm X Park became a destination 
for radicals.68  
                                                 
66 “Washington Chapter Official,” The Black Panther, 26 June 1970, 1. 
67 See map on page 58. 
68 “Meridan Hill Park up to be renamed Malcolm X Park” Washington Evening Star, 22 June 1969, 
A1, Col. 1.  
 28
The townhouse at 1822 18th street, once the headquarters of the six-month-old 
National Coalition to Combat Fascism, transformed into a headquarters for an official 
Panther party.  As decreed by the National Headquarters in Oakland, the official 
Washington chapter excluded white members of the NCCF, who formed a new party, 
the Patriots.  The Patriots, along with representatives from the Young Lords, a 
revolutionary Puerto Rican group based on the Panther model, formed an alliance 
with the D.C. Panthers and lived collectively in adjoining town houses in the 
Shaw/Adams Morgan area of the District for four years.69   
The first major undertaking of the chapter happened in late June, the opening 
of a community center on 17th street, less than two blocks from the Third District 
Police headquarters.  For two weeks the Panthers began their process to win over 
their neighbors and to establish their presence in the Adams Morgan area.  The 
Washington summer continued to grow hotter.  The July 4th holiday was right around 
the corner and friction was growing between the D.C. police and the Panthers.  The 
Black Panther Party’s publications calling for the blood of police and songs chanted 
from Panther gatherings, like “Off the Pigs,” got the attention of the Third District 
officers. 
On July 4, 1970, around 10:30 P.M., the Washington Metropolitan Police 
Department responded to a noise ordinance violation at the location of 1932 17th St 
NW.  Osa Massen, a fifteen year old member of the Party recalled “ the one time that 
there was a police raid just because we were singing ‘Off the Pigs.’  The police came 
up the stairs like storm troopers breaking cement on the stairs.  Their justification was 
that someone threw a brick and hit a cop in the face.  No one knew of that 
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happening.”70  The officer hit with the brick that required stitches to his head soon 
appeared in the local papers.  The differing views on the raid quickly became 
apparent. 
Two different stories of the incident emerged.  The chapter was less then two 
weeks old and chapter members believed that the major reason for the raid on the 
Panther community center was police desire to intimidate the Panthers.  The police 
contend that “they were in hot pursuit of a felon,” who had assaulted a peace officer.  
On  July 5 the Washington Evening Star reported that the incident began after the 
group would not stop singing “We shall overcome,” and chanting “Power to the 
People.”71  Conflicting with the Washington Evening Star, the Washington Daily 
News whose readership was predominantly black stated that the group was not 
singing spiritual songs but quoted a Panther saying, “Who sings that anymore? -We 
were singing `Power to the People- Off the Pigs’.  Are the papers afraid to print 
that?”72 
The warrantless raid was violent and chaotic.  Several different accounts 
basically told the story of the Panthers taunting the police and throwing rocks and 
bottles at the first police that arrived.  Someone hit Officer Robinson in the face with 
a brick, busting his scalp wide open.  More officers arrived and one charged into the 
crowd flailing a nightstick.  Most of the Panthers retreated inside their community 
center, but some still stayed out on the steps and porch taunting the officers.  A third 
group of police arrived and the rest of the men retreated inside.  The police then 
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proceeded to break the door down and arrest everyone inside, taking them to Third 
District Police Headquarters, three blocks away.73 
Maurice Laurence, information officer for the local chapter, told the story this 
way.  “The people were so stimulated by the songs, so they sang louder.  Then the 
pigs moved in and we went into the house.  Then they kicked in the door and started 
beating everybody.” A police official said there was “some struggling” as arrests 
were made.74 
 Maurice Laurence also stated that over eight hundred dollars in cash 
disappeared during the police raid.  The raid coincided with the theft of the monies 
targeted for the Free Breakfast and Clothing Program.  In the Washington Afro-
American, Laurence was quoted, “These Fascist fools with wrecking hammers and 
axes in their hands started chasing children, women, and men all over the house like 
mad slave catchers.  It took five or six for every brother.  They handcuffed the 
brothers, threw them on the floor and began their mad terrorist act of beating, 
stomping, and kicking.”75  Throughout Panther literature and interviews, accusations 
of Fascism and Fascist actions of the federal government sought to symbolize the 
oppression and heavy-handed justice felt by the Panthers.  The Saturday, July 4th raid 
seemed another instance of injustice to the Panthers, and the claims of Fascist attacks 
on the D.C. Panthers arose soon after.  All the Panthers posted the $10 collateral and 
were released from jail on Sunday, July 5th. 
 The confrontation sparked attention throughout the community and led to a 
march on the Third Street Police Station on the night of July 4th.  The crowd, many 
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whom witnessed the raid, was hostile towards the police and marched the few blocks 
from the Panther Community Information Center.  Almost 200 people strong, the 
crowd wielded rocks and beer bottles.  The police set up extra guards and called for 
backup to control the riotous and dangerous crowd.76 
Tensions between police and Panther supporters simmered all night although 
the crowd eventually dispersed by early morning when all the Panthers were released.  
These demonstrators were determined to block police brutality and warrantless raids.  
Demonstrators protested how the police broke into the Panther headquarters, beat 
them up, and arrested them without the due process of law.  The new high profile in 
the community of the Black Panthers was the reason many suspected the police used 
violent tactics in raiding and searching the headquarters. 
 The Evening Star described the incident two days later, publishing the fact 
that all the guns taken from the Black Panther Community Center by the police were 
not registered.  Two rifles, a shotgun, and a pistol, along with over two hundred 
rounds of ammunition were seized.  In this article the police declined to answer the 
charges that arresting officers destroyed personal property, including clothing, 
furniture, and tape recordings.  James Heller, a lawyer for the Black Panther’s 
Washington Chapter, told the Evening Star that “it was a unbelievable mess. The 
place was completely ransacked.”  A Black Panther named Maxine told the paper that 
one of her eight year-old daughters was knocked downstairs and her sixteen-month-
old baby received a bump on the head.77 
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 John O’Bryant, Washington’s Metropolitan Police Chief at the time, spoke of 
the incident in these terms.  “ I don’t regard the Black Panther as something 
exceptional.  They do not warrant special concern.  What may be considered a threat 
to other departments is not what we consider a threat here.  We deal with 
demonstrations differently from other departments.”78  Much of the Panther notoriety, 
he said, comes from the publicity.  “They need confrontation and they’re not going to 
get it here.”79  He did set up a probe into the allegations of the beatings and the theft 
of the Black Panther’s funds for the Free Breakfast program.  Maurice Laurence, 
spokesman for the chapter, described the probe as useless.  Laurence viewed these 
probes as something that happens “every time a pig takes an oppressive act against 
the people.”80  The violent tone and rhetoric that echoed during the summer of 1970 
increased the pressure on the Washington chapter. 
 Marion Barry, head of Pride, chaired the Citizens’ Board of the Pilot District 
Project, an experimental project in which citizens of the Third Police district were 
given a say in their police services.  Quoted in the Washington Daily News, Marion 
Barry announced an investigation into the incident.  “The July 4 incident has come to 
our attention and we are going to find out what happened.”81  Mr. Barry said the 
Panthers had indicated they would cooperate with his investigating committee.  The 
report was to be submitted to the citizen’s board on July 30, 1970.  “We’ll decide 
what to do from there.  We just want to make sure the police department is doing its 
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job and that our people are cooperating with them.”82  The publicity from the incident 
landed Willie Dawkins, an organizer of the Washington Chapter, a local television 
interview with WMAL-TV/7. 
 In a televised interview on WMAL-TV’s “Newswatch” show which aired 
Sunday, July 26, 1970, Willie Dawkins stated that the government is “taking away the 
constitutional rights of black and white people instead of enforcing them.”  He 
recanted historical events to describe these “fascist tendencies,” saying, “in Chicago, 
not only at the conspiracy trial (of the State’s Attorney raiders of the Panthers who 
shot up the house, killing two Panthers and wounded seven more), but at the 
Democratic Convention where they said they would not give their children a voice in 
the decision-making of the country.  In fact, we’ll prosecute and murder them if we 
have to.”83  While this made for good ratings, the content and militant rhetoric of 
Dawkins and Lawrence continued to incense local law enforcement.  The 
confrontational tone of these early days of the D.C. chapter resulted in intense 
surveillance and persecution of the Panthers. 
Willie Dawkins, organizer, Jim Williams, coordinator, and Charles Brunson 
minister of defense, provided the local leadership which oversaw the NCCF transform 
into an official Black Panther Party during summer 1970.  Hilliard himself placed 
Charles Brunson, a senior Panther member, in charge of organizing and securing the 
Convention site.  In August 1970 he was charged for the unregistered weapons 
confiscated by the police on the Fourth of July raid.  The D.C. police department, the 
U.S. Attorney’s office and lawyers for the Panthers worked together to avert a 
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potentially explosive situation.  They allowed Brunson, charged with possession of a 
prohibited weapon, to surrender voluntarily in the Court of General Sessions rather 
than issue an arrest warrant.  The U. S. Attorney explained that the warrant was not 
issued because, “Experience in other cities indicates they have had major 
confrontations.”  So, “when we have a viable alternative, we should use it.”84  The 
government wanted to avoid another major raid but continue the pressure on the 
Panther chapter. 
 Zayd Shakur, Panther deputy minister of information for the East Coast, stated 
that if a warrant was issued, police will be allowed to search Panther offices or homes 
“as long as they are accompanied by members of the community, namely the 
Citizens’ Board of the Pilot Precinct Project and our attorneys.”  He also said that 
“the person that the police are looking for is not in any of our offices or homes” but 
also “judging from the repressive history meted out against our party and black 
people here in Babylon, we think it would be stupid and absurd for us to turn over one 
of our members to barbaric tortures.”85  Shakur came down to the D.C. chapter from 
New York City after the July 4th raid, and guided the response of the Panthers for the 
next few months.  The Panthers continued their belligerent tone for the next six 
months.86 
The height of publicity of the D.C. Panthers came in the first months of 
existence, from June to November 1970.  The Panthers were in every newspaper in 
D.C. and the chapter enjoyed new recruits among local black radicals.  The growth of 
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the chapter was problematic because many new recruits were enchanted by the image 
of the Panthers, and knew little about the Ten Point Platform and the community 
services central to goals of the party.  The Black Panther’s major confrontation with 
the Metropolitan Police happened within two weeks of its formation, and the 
Washington chapter felt it was necessary to publicly explain to the community and 
other radicals why it did not have a shoot out with the police.  The Black United 
Front, a rival Black Nationalist organization, questioned the tough talk of the 
Panthers, and used the raid as an example of Panther bluster and cowardice.   
In an open letter to the community the D.C. Panthers responded to the Black 
United Front.  On one side of the letter was drawn an armed Panther holding a bloody 
machete and a pig’s head with a police officer’s cap, and while the other side declared 
the chapter’s position on the raid.  Entitled “Death to the Fascist Pigs,” the letter was 
distributed with Black Panther Newspapers and outside the community information 
center and Chapter headquarters. It challenged the rumor that the Panthers were 
scared of the police. 
“Some of our peoples that weren’t on the scene are wondering if we violated 
our principles by not wiping out the first of those gangsters that crashed through our 
door.  Then some of our comrades who weren’t at the scene are questioning the order 
that was given to ‘hold our fire until we’re fired upon.’”  The D.C. Panthers went on:  
 
“We’ll kill anybody that stands in the way of our freedom. And 
because they were able to take four of our weapons and beat us 
after we didn’t shoot, they still can’t stop us.  How can they? 
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We will take a hundred beatings as long as it educates our 
people on the necessity of arming themselves.  Every attack the 
pigs make brings them closer to their DOOM!”87 
 
The flyer was meant to assure Washington’s black community the Panthers were 
prepared to fight the law.  The Panthers were focused on being the most radical, the 
most revolutionary group in D.C.  Under direction of Zayd Shakur, the Panthers 
continued preaching military revolution.  By 1970 the National Committee began to 
purge its most militant and violent members.  The split between Cleaver and Newton 
began with these purges.  Cleaver preached the need for urban guerrilla warfare and 
Newton declared community organization and education the number one priority.  
Shakur and his wife, Assata Shakur, left the Panthers in the fall of 1970 to join 
Eldridge Cleaver’s splinter group the Black Liberation Army, a much more militant 
and violent revolutionary group comprised of the most militant ex-members of the 
Panthers.  In 1973 Zayd Shakur and a New Jersey State Trooper were killed in a 
shootout on the side of the New Jersey Turnpike, and Assata Shakur was arrested for 
the death of the trooper.  In 1979 she escaped prison and fled to Cuba, where she 
currently resides.88  The Panthers who gravitated to Cleaver’s group often ended up 
imprisoned or killed; at the national level the Panthers refocused on community 
survival programs. 
The violent tone and confrontational posture of the chapter kept it in the sights 
of the Metropolitan Police and the FBI.  With Charles Brunson charged, law 
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enforcement continued surveillance and worked on infiltration and building a network 
of informants to destabilize and destroy the Panthers in D.C.89 
On September 5, 1970 the plenary session for the Convention began in 
Philadelphia.  Plans were finalized to hold the Convention in D.C. Thanksgiving 
weekend.90  Members of the Washington D.C. chapter of the Black Panther Party 
continued looking for a location that could accommodate the 7,500-8,000 people 
expected to arrive for the convention.  After meeting with people from almost all of 
the Washington area’s largest places of public assembly, the members of the local 
Chapter, in cooperation with other groups in the city, requested permission to rent the 
National Guard Armory for the Constitutional Convention.  A three-man civilian 
board, composed of a Montgomery County businessman, a general in the National 
Guard, and a representative of Mayor Walter Washington, reviewed the application 
for the use of the armory and turned it down because the convention conflicted with 
prearranged activities.  Representatives of the Black Panther Party went back to the 
Armory Board and asked specifically if the convention could be held on 
Thanksgiving weekend.  On October 6th, 1970 Armory head Administrator Arthur 
Bergman said that the armory was no longer to be used for “rock concerts or 
organizations such as yours.”91  The powers that controlled the armory were steadfast 
in their refusal, and the Panthers had little chance to lease the armory, or other large 
convention hall because of their militant rhetoric and communist platform. 
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That same day the Panthers’ application was turned down, Elbert “Big Man” 
Howard, the National Black Panther Minister of Defense and Editor of the Black 
Panther Newspaper, called a press conference on the steps of the Washington 
headquarters to discuss the Armory Board’s action.  “Why should the Black People of 
D.C., which is 80% of the population, pay their tax dollars for a facility that exists 
primarily for the use of white people who live outside the community?”92  The 
establishment’s silence on the matter reinforced the feeling among the Panthers that 
there was little chance to secure the needed large hall for the convention. 
 Following the denial, a law suit was then filed by the Panthers and their 
lawyers on the grounds that one of the stated uses of the National Guard Armory is 
for “conventions” and that to refuse permission to the armory for the Revolutionary 
Peoples constitutional convention was a violation of the constitutional rights to 
freedom of assembly.  The suit was denied by the D.C. superior court because the 
Panthers could not prove that a convention hall was necessary for their convention.93  
An example of bias against the Panthers by the courts, the ruling reflected the 
Washington elite’s fears of the Panthers and method of the government using all 
means necessary to sabotage the Panthers’ Convention. 
 At the same time that the Panthers were working on getting the D.C. Armory 
for the Convention, students representing the Democratic Radical Union of the 
University of Maryland (DRUM) and the Student Government Association began to 
negotiate with the University of Maryland administration for use of Cole Field House 
for the convention activities.  Despite growing support of on-campus groups and 
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individuals, use of the field house was denied.94  According to the decision makers, 
the Panthers were refused because of the potential for violence associated with the 
Black Panther image. 
 Even though a guaranteed convention meeting place had not yet been found, 
groups in Washington took the initiative in organizing housing, food, and 
transportation which were needed for attendees and convention participants.  Anti-
War G.I.s, Women’s Liberation, Gay Liberation, The Youth International Party 
(YIP), and numerous campus organizations made arrangements for their particular 
workshops.  The Panthers envisioned high-school students, college students, workers, 
street people, and welfare recipients working to perfect a vision of a new America.95  
This new vision included participatory democracy, socialist programs, an end to 
imperialism, racism and social classes, and a more open society with new personal 
freedoms.  The ideal was easy to envision but hard to implement. 
Attempts to sabotage the convention were organized by the FBI, the 
Metropolitan Police, and carried out by law enforcement and local utility companies.  
The convention was denied the armory and the University of Maryland’s Cole Field 
House.  Jim Williams and Elbert “Big Man” Howard from Panther national 
headquarters scrambled to find a convention hall.  The Panthers complained of “a 
large machine designed to destroy all revolutionary movements in the United States, 
the Black Panther Party in particular.  Because the Convention is scheduled for 
Washington D.C., the police harassment of the local Chapter of the Black Panther 
                                                 
94 “U MD Dismisses Panthers,” Washington Post, 22 August 1970, C3. 
95 Flyer for the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention, November 27-29, 1970, Senator 
James Eastland Papers, National Archives. 
 40
party has become heavier as the opening date of the Convention moved closer.”96  
The police began to arrest the leadership of the Panthers in particular, and used 
information from the FBI and the intelligence section of the Metropolitan Police 
department to go after Panthers with the greatest visibility.  
D.C. Panther members Willie Dawkins and Robert Schoop were listed on 
warrants of “Criminal Anarchy” and “Flight to Avoid Prosecution” issued on 
September 17, 1970 by the District Attorney of New Orleans.  The warrants became 
public one day after a brutal raid of the New Orleans NCCF which resulted in the 
arrest of 14 members of that committee.  Both Schoop and Dawkins had important 
duties in the organization of the convention, and now had to defend themselves in 
court, represented by attorneys of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).97  The 
ACLU took the case because it felt the Panthers were being targeted for their political 
affiliations. 
In addition to legal pressure, financial pressure increased against the 
Washington Chapter.  Threats from the gas, electric, and telephone companies 
insisted that if the bills were not paid immediately on the date due, the utilities would 
be disconnected and a two hundred dollar deposit would be required to re-install 
them.  This was a much different policy than other customers of the utilities, who 
often had a two-month window to pay late bills before services were denied.  The 
pressure on the Washington Chapter in the summer and fall of 1970 increased legally 
and financially. 
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The FBI’s Counter Intelligence Project (CONITELPRO) used eavesdropping, 
bogus mail, disinformation, and harassment arrests to deepen the split and create 
animosity between Panther leaders.  The FBI and local law enforcement created 
intense pressure on the D.C. Panthers, especially by manufacturing threats from rival 
black revolutionary groups such as the Black Nationalists.  The FBI used agent 
provocateurs and infiltrators to sow dissent in the leadership of Panthers, and 
advocated violence that often ended in arrest or death.98  The Panthers in D.C. had to 
deal with this persecution of local law enforcement and the strife that afflicted the 
National Headquarters. 
By the end of 1970 the Black Panther's national circulation reached 250,000, 
and the Panthers continued to use the paper to fund the party.99  In D.C., the members 
of the Panther chapter continued to pound the pavement and spread the word.  Osa 
Massen, a sixteen-year-old member of the party recalled selling papers on 14th and H 
in front of the Waxie Maxie record store, a popular hangout where “everyone” went.  
“I can remember having conversations with people going in and out of the record 
store.  It really was a good feeling to sell all of them.”100  She stated how “we also 
had an information table in front of the house where we would sell books or give out 
information, and I would sometimes sit out there to speak with the people in the 
community.”101  The dedication and devotion of some members began to change the 
perception of the Panthers as violent militants. 
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Sherry Brown, the Minister of Information for the D.C. and Baltimore Panther 
chapters, described competing cultural nationalist organizations in the District, 
including Stokely Carmichael’s All-African People's Revolutionary Party (AAPRP).  
The AAPRP, Black United Front, and other Pan-Africanist organizations felt the 
Black Panthers should not associate with SDS and other white leftists, particularly the 
Patriots.  They felt black activists should not look to white activists for help, and 
“D.C.’s cultural nationalists had a more nationalistic line about black community, 
exclusively black police, businesses, government.”102  The former Minister of 
Information of the D.C. Panthers stated his group had a coalition building and 
international approach; and the Panthers took a lot of criticism in the black 
community for their cooperation with white radicals.103  By fall of 1970 the Black 
Panther Party leadership supported coalitions with groups working for female and gay 
liberation, and in the Shaw/Cordozo/Columbia Heights neighborhoods cultural 
nationalists used these unpopular issues to deter recruits from joining the D.C. chapter 
and steer them to other organizations.  
 When asked about the paucity of recruits in D.C., Sherry Brown stated that, 
“it was a very white-collar, very bourgeois city.  D.C. was more of a middle-class 
city, unlike the Baltimore and Philly chapters that had many more members and had a 
lot more going on.  Baltimore and Philadelphia were blue collar, were more lumpen 
proletariat folks, and they were the primary recruiting target.  Panthers would work 
with the poorest of the poor.  Washington had more government jobs here and had a 
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more bourgeois orientation.”104  The lack of heavy industry, such as the steel mills 
and ports in Baltimore, made Washington harder to organize.  Much of the District’s 
black workforce was not unionized, and therefore less class-conscious than other 
industrial cities.   
 In the fall of 1970 the Panthers sued the Metropolitan Police for the July 4th 
raid. The Washington chapter lawyers filed a $1 million dollar lawsuit against the 
police, and a week later on October 17th all charges against those arrested in the 
confrontation were dropped, including the charges against Charles Brunson for 
possession of illegal weapons.105  The Panthers were sure that they would be raided 
again, and desired greater firepower.  Charles Brunson, a founding member of the 
chapter and in charge of convention organization, again was jailed on weapons 
charges from a traffic stop on Interstate 95 in Virginia. 
Brunson’s path to imprisonment began with the theft of a Chinese sub-
machine gun and a Russian light machine gun from the residence of a Richmond, 
Virginia gun collector in October 1970.  In Richmond, contacts with the Black 
Panthers in Washington told of the cache, now including German machine guns as 
well, and Charles Brunson traveled to Richmond to secure the arms for the D.C. 
chapter.  With him was Jacob Bethea, a fellow D.C. Panther.  They were arrested on 
Interstate 95 in Virginia for the crime of transporting stolen weapons and faced trial 
on May 21, 1971.  Brunson and Bethea were convicted with Bethea given eight years 
and Brunson four years.106 
                                                 
104 Sherry Brown, interview with author, 20 February 2006. 
105 “All Charges Dismissed in Panther Case”, Washington Post, 17 October 1970, C1, Col.1. 
106 “Three Convicted in Panther Weapon Case,” Washington Evening Star, 7 July, 1971, B3, p. 3. 
 44
 When Brunson and Bethea were arrested, there was little over a month left to 
plan for the Revolutionary Peoples Convention.  The Panthers resubmitted their 
proposal for the later dates of November 27, 28, and 29, 1970, and the Armory board 
again denied their proposal.  D.C. Panther leaders Willie Dawkins, Juan Shoop, Jacob 
Bethea, and Charles Brunson were jailed on various charges, and less inexperienced 
Panthers had a month to find a hall. 
The Black Panther lawyers asked that all nine appellate judges of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals be present to hear the complaints of the Panthers.  A previous 
hearing with three appellate judges was denied, and the Panthers sought better odds in 
finding a way to coerce the armory to let them hold their convention there.  Panther 
lawyers claimed that the three-judge panel “has permitted the government to deny 
access to the only suitable hall in Washington for the conducting of the proposed 
convention for reasons based on vague fears.”  The Panthers were officially denied 
access to the armory on the first week in November 1970.  They had only three weeks 
to find another location of the convention.107   
Their last choice was the campus of Howard University.  The university was 
disinclined to offer its facilities but reluctantly agreed.  Howard University was 
planning to charge the Panthers $10,823.06 for the use of the facilities, in advance.108  
The chapter did not have the funds to pay a fee that large and pleaded with the 
university to donate the use of the campus “to the people.”  An unidentified Black 
Panther Party spokesman told the Washington Daily News that the Panthers were 
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willing to pay $1,000 in advance and the rest later, but the university rejected the 
offer.  The Panthers had no place to hold the nationally publicized convention. 
At the last minute, the Black Panthers received a permit from the National 
Park Service to hold a rally at Malcolm X Park to tell the delegates that the 
convention was off.109  The six months the Panthers had to organize were frustrated 
by persecution and institutional bias against the radical organization. 
Hundreds of delegates from all around the nation converged on Washington 
on November 27, 1970, to attend the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional 
Convention sponsored by the Black Panther Party’s Washington Chapter.  Malcolm X 
Park was filled with representatives from the Socialist party, the Youth International 
party, Women’s Collective, Young Lords, and the Gay Liberation.  Instead of telling 
the convention to disband, the Panther’s Minister of Information, Elbert “Big Man” 
Howard, announced that they would stay in Washington for three days, or three 
months if necessary, until they had found a suitable convention hall.110  Sympathetic 
ministers in the Shaw/Cardozo opened their doors to the arriving activists, many of 
whom were white.  After registering at the All Souls Unitarian Church on 16th and 
Harvard Street and St. Stephen and the Incarnation Church near the Panther 
headquarters the delegates were told to canvass Washington’s inner city.  By mid-
afternoon, the delegates organized into workshops, divided up by region.  They 
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concentrated on important issues and worked for different social policies to create a 
better society.111   
Huey Newton, freed from prison in August 1970, made a rare public 
appearance at the convention, and gave a speech at St. Stephen’s Episcopal Church 
on Saturday, November 28.  He declared that the Black Panthers’ immediate goal was 
“revolutionary intercommunialism, under which oppressed communities around the 
world would cooperate to destroy capitalism.”112  Newton told the delegates that they 
would get a “rain check” on writing a new constitution.  The Panther leaders, 
however, gave the delegates a draft of the proposed constitution written by the 
participants of the Philadelphia Plenary session in September 1970.113 
Students across America descended on Washington, some with the hope of 
massive, revolutionary change and some with the intent just to escape and enjoy the 
bands. The convention was marked with confusion.  It began when the Panthers had 
trouble finding a meeting place and continued when the gay liberation movement and 
the women’s liberation movement threatened several times to split from the 
convention because of perceived homophobic and misogynistic comments by 
speakers.  The lack sufficient public space made it impossible for participants to meet 
and discuss issues. These logistical issues destroyed the concept of drafting new 
documents and mandates, and the Convention ended informally when it disbanded for 
lack of attention.  Delegates to the Black Panther-sponsored revolutionary convention 
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left Washington with a draft constitution that had little work done to it, and with little 
else to show for two days of apparently aimless activity on the sidewalks along 16th 
street NW.  According to newspaper sources between 3,000 and 5,000 predominantly 
white young persons arrived from across the United States but the planned workshops 
never developed because Panther organizers were unable to obtain an indoor 
convention site.114 
 The Panthers’ meeting, to give blacks a bigger role in government, was a 
complete flop.  Delegates started leaving almost immediately, and many of the young 
whites that stayed through the last night left angry and disappointed at the 
disorganization of the Panthers.  These delegates felt that the Panthers should have 
solved the logistical problems.  The problems of the Panthers highlighted the struggle 
that pitted integrationists and liberationists, such as the Panthers, against black 
nationalists and Pan-Africanists, including some black intellectuals and the Black 
Muslims.  The majority white turnout for the Panther convention reinforced the idea 
that the Panthers were working in partnership with whites.  Panther rivals like the 
Afro-American Radical Peoples Party, led by Stokely Carmichael and Reverend 
Douglas Moore’s Black United Front used the cooperation with the white radicals as 
a issue to isolate the Panthers from the Washington D.C. African American 
community. 
The Panthers were not in friendly territory.  Washington had the most middle-
class orientated blacks of any city in the United States, and had no heavy industry.  
The federal and city government’s were the biggest employers, and most blacks had a 
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middle-class political orientation in D.C.  African-Americans in Washington were 
among the wealthiest in the country, second only to the black community in Los 
Angeles.115  Also, radicalized civil rights groups SNCC and CORE folded in D.C. 
before they did in other cities, establishing a precedent for the failure of militant 
organizations like the Panthers.116 
"This town has always had an appeal to the black middle class," says 
demographer George Grier. "Even when this town was segregated that held true. 
There were more good, decent jobs here for blacks than most anywhere else."117  
Uncle Sam was hiring African Americans in jobs more or less commensurate with 
their training long before the private sector adopted even the rhetoric of equal 
opportunity. The presence of Howard University also helped. The "black Harvard," 
was the first historically black university to offer a full complement of professional 
schools, from law to dentistry to medicine, to go along with its broad range of 
undergraduate programs.  This strong black middle class resisted revolutionary 
change, and supported conservative politicians and ministers.118  
Howard University’s famous alumnus Stokely Carmichael broke with the 
Panthers in 1969, terming the party “dogmatic” and its tactics “dishonest and 
vicious.”119  Considered a hero on the campus of Howard, the Panther message of 
coalition building with whites fell on deaf ears of Howard students, many who 
believed more in Pan-Africanism.  Pan-Africanism’s goal of unity of Africans and the 
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elimination of colonialism and white supremacy in Africa differed from the 
international goals of the Black Panthers.  Newton referred to these differences in the 
Washington black community in his speech at St. Stephens.  He maintained that the 
Panthers had a you-cannot-go-home-again attitude about Africa, and said that the 
party was internationalist rather than nationalist.120 
To top off the failure of the convention, fourteen Panthers were removed from 
an American Airlines flight 75 to Los Angeles on Sunday, November 29, allegedly 
for being “boisterous and unruly” as the plane prepared to take off from Dulles 
International Airport.  A stewardess didn’t want to fly with the considerable swearing 
and shouting Panthers, the plane turned around and the fourteen Panthers were 
forcibly removed and issued refunds.121  This last bit of bad press became the salt in 
the wounds for the Washington chapter, and the criticism heaped on the chapter 
became intense from the embarrassed National Headquarters. 
The convention was a turning point for the Washington chapter, a low point in 
which the rebellious glamour of the party had worn off, and the work of social change 
took center stage.  The change from a fiery militant party to involved community 
activists was the result of the directives of the national office, law enforcement 
pressures, and rival Black Nationalists in the District.  In addition, the problems of 
dealing with congressionally appointed city government officials made it difficult to 
organize the urban poor through city government structures.  The D.C. Panthers 
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evolved into an independent-minded community support organization until all party 
members were called to Oakland in early 1973. 
The newspapers of Washington described the Panthers in starkly different 
terms, with the Washington Post and the Washington Evening Star siding often with 
law enforcement sources and rival militants when reporting about Panther activities 
during the six months of June to November 1970.  Black newspapers like the 
Washington Daily News or the Washington Afro-American supported Panther views, 
and interviewed members of the D.C. Panthers decried the obstacles that were unique 
to the Washington chapter.  The experience of the Panthers in their first six months of 
existence was manic, with all of the problems and persecutions intertwined with the 
militant rhetoric espousing fighting the law.  The following six months the Party 
calmed its tone and began its survival programs among D.C.’s poor, and aimed to 
change its image as a troublemaker. 
The militant posture the Panthers took in the first months of existence 
exacerbated the tension from law enforcement, rival cultural nationalist groups, and 
neighbors who viewed the Panthers as excessive.  Continued pressure from these 
groups, combined with criticism and factionalism from the national headquarters, 
modified the Panthers actions and their focus, and a much different Washington 
Chapter of the Black Panther Party emerged. 
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D.C. PANTHERS SHIFT TO COMMUNITY ACTIVISM 
 
 
The Washington chapter of the Black Panther Party regrouped from the failure 
of the Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention.  During the winter of 1970-
71 membership in the chapter steadily decreased, and the revolutionary rhetoric 
lessenned.  The Panthers set up and initiated programs after the debacle of the 
Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention passed.  The most important 
program the Panthers set up was the Free Breakfast program in the poor 
neighborhoods of Shaw/Cardozo and Anacostia.  The feeding of children before 
school gained the party credibility in the black press of D.C. and the Panther 
community center on 17th street operated the first Free Breakfast Program.  The next 
year the Panthers expanded the program to other locations in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods in Northeast Washington.  The Panthers also set up a Free Bussing to 
Lorton Prison program, which allowed those without a car to visit incarcerated city 
residents jailed twenty miles south in Lorton, Virginia.  The Angela Davis People’s 
Free Food Program was a food bank for the neighborhood poor that began in 1971, 
and eventually the People’s Free Health Clinic based in the blighted Anacostia 
neighborhood.122 
 At the national level a major split divided the Black Panthers after the 
Revolutionary Peoples Constitutional Convention.  Loyalties to party leadership were 
shaken when Eldridge Cleaver broke with Oakland and while in Algeria began the 
international section of the party, soon to be renamed the Black Liberation Army that 
advocated urban guerrilla warfare.  Newton and Seale denounced the “treason,” and 
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changed focus to education and political organization.  Still a revolutionary party, the 
Panthers shift to community programs was important to lay the foundation for the 
eventual revolution.  This split led to the eventual crumbling and fracturing of the 
party.123 
By 1972, the Black Panther Party of Washington D.C. had opened the 
People’s Free Health Clinic in the basement of the Johenning Baptist Center at 4025 
9th St SE.  At this time the membership of the party had decreased from a high of one 
hundred members in 1970 to thirty-five or forty members.  Health coordinator 
Catherine Showell described the clinic for a reporter, stating “We aren’t going to 
shoot anybody.” The physician in charge of the clinic, Dr. Jean Linzau, taught at 
Howard University.124 
 “I was working on setting up free health clinics in Mississippi, working as the 
Medical Director of the Howard University Mississippi Project.” stated Linzau.  “I 
returned late in 1971 and was contacted by the Panthers to see if I would help set up a 
free health clinic in D.C.  I volunteered and looked at the new home of the free clinic.  
The basement was filthy, and had to be remodeled for the clinic.  The medical 
equipment was mostly donations and old rejected stuff.  Several doctors 
volunteered.”125 
“The worst part of the clinic was that we never had the right drug for the 
disease.  We would get our drugs from pharmaceutical companies that would hand 
out promotional ‘samples.’  Therefore we were always in desperate need of drugs.  
                                                 
123 Hugh Pearson.  The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in 
America, (New York: Addison-Wesley), 1994, p 270-296. 
124John Saar.  “Health Clinic is Opened By Panthers,” Washington Post, 21 May 1972, C1, p. 1, 7.  
125 Jean Linzau,M.D. interview by author, 12 April 1996, Washington D.C. 
 53
The clinic did help out people that would of gotten sicker if there was no place to go 
if you had little or no money.”126  The Panthers’ free health clinic represented their 
commitment to the community, and the remaining members of the Panthers were 
extremely active in the D.C. community.  From clothes to rides, from breakfast to 
baby sitting, from food to health care, the Panthers established a survival network for 
many of the District’s poorest residents.  The Black Panthers were credited for 
understanding the needs of its community, and lived in the communities they helped 
support.  Ron Clark, a young supporter of the Panthers, described the leader of the 
D.C. Panthers, Jim Williams, as the “Marxist Guru” who always viewed society in 
class terms.  He also practiced what he preached by living communally with other 
Panthers. 
 When asked about the Panthers’ living conditions Dr. Linzau replied, “They 
did take care of each other.   They lived in an enormous building on 4th street and all 
of them lived together.  The women and the men all had sex with each other.  I 
remember when the clinic would close and they would all line up to take shots to cure 
the sexually transmitted diseases they all caught from the same woman.  They didn’t 
use hard drugs, and asked for complete secrecy with their medical histories, for fear 
of government agents accessing them.  Therefore all their medical records were 
labeled by a code which only I had the master key.”  The government continued its 
war on the Panthers and the secrecy of Panther medical records was just one of the 
precautions the Panthers took against government intrusion.  Panthers had a vigorous 
process to weed out government agents and informers, and had little trust of 
outsiders.  They continued to focus on community organization and services, but 
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assumed a raid by law enforcement was an eventuality and fortified their living 
quarters and headquarters with metal doors and reinforced windows. 
 Linzau stated “I never got paid, but they invited me to their complex on 4th 
street to eat and talk.  I would go over to their complex and enjoy relaxing 
conversation and meals with them.”127  The Panthers accepted Dr. Linzau for his 
volunteer work at their clinic, and his interaction with the D.C. Panthers intimately 
depicts them.  Linzau stated that he never saw weapons but was sure they were there.  
The D.C. Panthers also were very paranoid about the government and about their own 
central party and after the split the group was rife with purges.  “They never knew 
who was going to report you to whom.”  Dr. Linzau said that the D.C. chapter was 
also very interested in “communalistic capitalism” where they could make some 
money for the group as a whole.  They wanted to “empower the poor people of 
society.”  He enjoyed the Panthers’ company and knew that they would always 
protect him from others.  “They were really trying to make a difference in this 
community.”128 
The Washington Chapter also supported other radical groups in Washington. 
The American Indian Movement, champions of Red Power, took over the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) building for six days close to Nixon’s reelection in November 
1972.  By the fifth day of the occupation, Election Day, one of the things that 
troubled federal forces was a rumor that the four-story building was wired with 
explosives.  The rumor gained traction when the leaders of the takeover held a joint 
news conference on the steps of the BIA on November 6, 1972. The leaders of the 
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takeover and the D.C. Black Panthers stood in solidarity against law enforcement, on 
the eve of Nixon’s reelection.  Jim Williams, the Washington Panther chapter head, 
stated the Panthers supported the Indian demands but declined to say if or how many 
Panthers were being added to the Indian forces.  Standing next to him was Russell 
Means, the leader of the American Indian Movement’s Trail of Broken Treaties. 
“If we go, we’re going to take this building with us.  If we go, this building is not 
going to be here- There’s going to be a helluva smoke signal,” Russell Means 
boasted.129 
 Tension abated because the administration tried to avoid a confrontation on 
the eve of the election.  The Indians abandoned the building after being guaranteed 
money and safe transport by the Nixon Administration.  Before they left, they also 
ransacked the building and caused over two million dollars in damages.130 
 In 1972 a synopsis of the Panthers was published in the Washington Evening 
Star, describing how they metamorphosed into a party with less militant 
proclamations and more involved in securing the party goals of education, political 
and economic freedom for black people.  In June 1972 the Panthers initiated a 
program to provide free rides to the elderly to and from local banks on the first of the 
month when welfare and Social Security checks arrived.131  Charles Brunson, still 
active in the chapter and freed from prison, stated “While the Panthers nationally 
were doing great things politically, here in D.C. we were producing a new image for 
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the Panthers.”132  This new image was one of community activism, with volunteerism 
the main focus of the Panthers. 
 Anita Stroud, also a longtime member of the party, explained, “those who left 
the party did so because all the romanticism disappeared when we stopped making 
headlines, and the military dress disappeared, and the flame died.”133  The smaller and 
more dedicated Black Panther Party of 1972 differed significantly from the violent 
militant group who attacked police officers with bottles and bricks in 1970.  The 
Panther programs continued, and the publicity of the first six months quickly quieted 
down after the Panther’s failed convention.  The Panther support of the American 
Indian Movement’s takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs by Jim Williams was the 
last major confrontational display of the Panthers’ in Washington, and after 
November 1972 the Washington Black Panther Party’s last appearance in the local 
media was when the leaders were summoned to headquarters and ordered the party 
disbanded and moved to Oakland.134.  Dr. Linzau described the end of the party as 
inevitable, and thought the clinic was going to stay open for only a few months 
anyway.  “It was only open for a few months and closed that winter.”  The programs 
were slowly dismantled and the community looked to other groups to help out where 
the party left off.135 
 The remaining members of the Washington Chapter moved to Oakland in the 
spring of 1973, and left behind the struggles in Washington.  Panthers blamed D.C.’s 
strong law enforcement agencies and the burgeoning black middle class which had 
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resisted the efforts to form a chapter for three years.  The strong cultural nationalist 
radical groups of D.C. added to the difficulty recruiting, and the lack of city 
government structures and forums also contributed to the Panthers failed attempt to 
organize for a revolution.   
 The confrontation on July 4th, 1970, when the chapter was only two weeks 
old, foretold an escalation of hostilities between the Panthers and law enforcement.  
The debacle of a convention later that year, combined with Bethea and Brunson’s 
conviction on weapons charges, made many lose respect for the Party. 
 In the years 1971 and 1972 the Panthers made numerous attempts to change 
their violent image by focusing on their community programs, but the image of the 
Panthers came primarily from the National Headquarters.  The leadership of the Party 
was stricken with confrontations and purges, and many members became 
disillusioned by the infighting of the leaders.  Jim Williams, the loyal captain of the 
D.C. Panthers, was expelled from the party for a short while in 1972 in one of the 
many purges by national leadership.  He said of the chapter in 1972, “We had no real 
influence in raising the consciousness of the black community, that is the point where 
we, the Panthers, failed.”136   
 The Black Panthers of Washington D.C. failed in recruiting for the revolution, 
and also failed organizing an historic convention where a new version of the 
American Constitution was to be drafted.  The great success of the Panthers in D.C. 
was the tradition of community activism that the Panthers inspired and the impact the 
Panthers had on poor families of D.C. who benefited from the Panthers’ actions.  The 
violent militaristic rhetoric the Panthers spouted in the first months of existence in 
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D.C. shifted to grassroots educational, political, and social programs.  These 
programs had much more influence on the D.C. community as a whole than any 
violent bluster from a press release or interview, and the legacy of the Panthers in 
D.C. is community service, which many surviving members still practice. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
The building that formerly housed the Black Panther Party Headquarters in 
Washington D.C. no longer stands.  In its place, just south of the newly revitalized 
Adams Morgan area is a community center run by the District.  It seems fitting that 
the headquarters was leveled and in its place a center constructed that accentuated all 
the good and supportive ideals of community.  The Washington Panthers were 
summoned by the national leadership of the Panthers to go to Oakland in early 1973, 
and some members of the Washington chapter still reside in California.  Charles 
Brunson now works with anti-poverty groups in Sacramento, California, and Sherry 
Brown spent nine years in Oakland until the Party finally collapsed in 1982. 
 Elbert “Big Man” Howard said that he “visited the Washington chapter often 
back in the day. I worked with the leadership as well as members of the rank and file. 
Jim Williams was in charge of the chapter.  He has passed on. I can tell you the 
chapter was very strong and made an impact on the community”.137  Howard is active 
in the Black Panther Alumni association, and lectures around the country about the 
legacy of the Black Panthers. 
 Activists like Marion Barry and Ron Clark, while not officially members, 
sympathized with the Panthers and work today with Washington’s disadvantaged.  
Dishonored by drug and tax prosecution, Marion Barry continues to be reelected in 
D.C. politics in part because of the anti-poverty work he piloted during the years of 
the neighboring Panther chapter and his support of Washington D.C.’s poor black 
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community.  Councilman and four-term Mayor Barry described his anti-poverty work 
as his great passion, and fellow sympathizer Ron Clark admired Black Panther 
captain Jim William’s as the “Marxist Guru” who described the issue of class conflict 
in layman’s terms.138   
D.C. Panther Osa Massen reflected “the party taught me social responsibility 
at an early age.  This early activist training followed me all of my life where on some 
level I have been of service to the people.139  D.C. Minister of Information Sherry 
Brown stated that community service was the goal of the Panthers.  “You joined the 
party because you wanted to uplift the communities.  I don’t see that as a change.  
That’s why I joined the Black Panther Party, because I thought that traditional civil 
rights organizations were not doing enough, and I wanted to uplift my community.”140 
Robert Rippy, the founder of the cultural nationalist Panthers, served three 
terms in federal prisons for drug or drug-related offenses; while serving he numbered 
among his acquaintances the Watergate burglars G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard 
Hunt and the spy Jonathan Pollard. Today, Rippy lives in Upper Cardozo, where he 
joined a program that trains public housing residents to help their neighbors protect 
their health. "The city government now ain't nothing but a bunch of consultants," he 
says. "Anybody can evaluate something and see the problems. We need to see the 
solutions."141  Many D.C. Panther members and sympathizers turned to community 
activism and local volunteer positions to continue the message of the party, “Power to 
the People.” 
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The Washington chapter of the Black Panther Party tried militancy, and the 
Washington Metropolitan Police surveilled, raided, and arrested the Panthers 
members.  New problems arose from the failure the Revolutionary Peoples 
Constitutional Convention and the split between the Cleaver and Newton faction 
polarized the Panthers.  Fragmentation of the national leadership made the D.C. 
Panthers feel they had more control over their programs because little direction 
emanated from Oakland. 
The dedicated and remaining Panthers invested themselves in the Washington 
community, inspiring new activists and programs supported by the newly formed City 
of Washington government.  The Free Breakfast Program inspired the D.C. 
government to offer it in their elementary schools, and the Panthers and other radicals 
pushed for charter schools that could create their own curriculum.  The D.C. Panthers 
sprouted in Washington during a period in which many wealthy D.C. blacks moved to 
the suburbs, and became a transition organization for the programs needed but not 
performed by the government.  City government projects like the Neighborhood 
Spending Programs and Neighborhood Citizen Oversight Boards gave poorer blacks 
greater control over their communities; the Panthers also inspired food banks, public 
transportation, and clothing donations to help the underprivileged.   
Because of the massive failure of the convention which drove many 
uncommitted Panther members away, the remaining revolutionary activists refocused 
their efforts to first and foremost assist the D.C. poor and then they sealed their 
legacy as dedicated community activists rather than violent rebels bent on the 
overthrow of the system. 
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